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Abstract:
We often lack clear procedures for assessing statements and arguments advanced in ev-
eryday conversations, political campaigns, advertisements, and the other multifarious
uses to which ordinary language can be put. Critical thinking is a method for evaluating
arguments couched in ordinary, non-formal language. Legal education should foster this
argumentative skill as an ability to assess the open-end variety of arguments that may
arise in legal disputes. I will argue that the ability of critical thinking helps lawyers to
thrive even in legal cultures that are hostile to critical thinking. There is, therefore, a
happy harmony between professional and moral reasons to teach critical thinking at law
schools: it promotes epistemic as well as instrumental rationality.
“Individuals who take an internal point of view [to the rules of a game] in-
deed have accepted the rules, for what reasons ever, and will subsequently
apply them as standards of correct behavior. But, nobody ‘must’ take an in-
ternal point of view. A participant can very well plan his moves in a game
from an external point of view. He does not accept the rules of preexisting in-
stitutional structures but merely exploits his knowledge of the institutional
facts in predicting what is going to happen within the game. The game of
arguing is no exception to this. Arguments may be strategic moves that are
planned from a purely instrumental external point of view like those of the
attorney at court or the Sophist in politics. In particular there are no ‘logical’
reasons why individuals must take an internal point of view and therefore
there are no logical reasons why they should be honest participants in this
sense.” (Kliemt 1990, 23f.)
1. Introduction
Do lawyers and other users of legal argument beneﬁt from thinking critically
in a legal culture hostile to critical thinking? Should law schools foster a dis-
position to think critically in such a culture? The discipline known as ‘critical
thinking’ or ‘informal logic’ has been growing over the last two decades. In the
English-speaking world, many undergraduate programs include courses on crit-
ical thinking. Moreover, widely used tests for admission in university programs
largely probe the critical-thinking skills of applicants, and test designers have
found a positive correlation between test scores and various measures of suc-374 Guido Pincione
cess at graduate school (see Graduate Record Examinations 2008). I will argue
in this paper that critical-thinking courses provide law students with an addi-
tional beneﬁt: they help lawyers thrive even in legal cultures that are hostile to
critical thinking to the point of rewarding certain patterns of ﬂawed public rea-
soning and penalizing certain patterns of sound public reasoning. I will further
contend that there is a happy harmony between pedagogical and moral reasons
to teach critical thinking at law schools, even if the prevailing legal culture is
not informed by it. My argument can be seen as a way of spelling out Harmut
Kliemt’s suggestion, in the epigraph, that a rational agent will ﬁnd ‘the game
of arguing’ as more or less worth playing, depending on his choice situation and
preferences. Kliemt’s remark is compatible with recognizing, as I will argue we
should, that thinking critically is, at the most fundamental level of practical
deliberation, non-optional for agents who are both epistemically and instrumen-
tally rational.
2. What Is Critical Thinking?
Critical thinking is a method for assessing arguments couched in ordinary, non-
formal language. Formal disciplines, such as mathematics and logic, contain
explicit rules for constructing ‘well-formed’ sentences or propositions (I will use
these terms interchangeably, although they have different meanings in more
technical discussions) and for accepting and rejecting well-formed sentences
(rules of inference). In contrast, we often lack crystal-clear procedures for as-
sessing statements and arguments advanced in everyday conversations, polit-
ical campaigns, advertisements, and the other multifarious uses to which or-
dinary language can be put. To be sure, we would be able to achieve deﬁnite
assessments if we could translate ordinary sentences into a formal language.
Unfortunately, however, our ability to translate an ordinary sentence into a for-
mal language depends on our previously identifying that sentence’s structural
features (its logical form, in technical jargon), and we typically cannot identify
those features on the basis of fully statable rules. One chief function of critical
thinking is to help us make such translations from the ordinary to the formal.
Critical thinking performs this function by making us aware of the speaker’s
intention, the context, and certain types of interpretive problems. Rather than
well-deﬁned recipes for good reasoning, recipes which are at home in formal con-
texts, critical thinking involves the kind of judgment that allows us to see the
relative weights of a variety of discursive factors in a particular context.1
A valid deductive argument is deﬁned as an argument whose conclusion must
be true if its premises are true. A correct inductive argument gives us reasons to
accept its conclusion, yet it does not guarantee that its conclusion is true, even if
the premises are true—it only makes the conclusion probable. Sound arguments
1 For an overview of critical thinking, including a discussion of the distinction that some authors
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(whether deductive or inductive) are valid, or correct, and have true premises.
The notions of validity and correctness apply to descriptive contexts, but they
can be extended to normative contexts; of course, such an extension is crucial
to legal argument. According to a widespread view, normative statements (e.g.,
‘Shut the door’, ‘It is morally impermissible to kill an innocent person for fun’)
are neither true nor false. The semantic status of legal sentences is compli-
cated by the fact that they seem akin to commands when issued by competent
authorities (imagine a legislature passing a statute providing that ‘Individuals
whose taxable income is above $1,000,000 a year shall pay a tax of 50 percent
on income’), whereas they seem akin to descriptive sentences when stated by
law professors (imagine a law professor teaching that ‘Individuals whose tax-
able income is above $1,000,000 a year shall pay a tax of 50 percent on income’).
Further complications arise with regard to legal sentences that are neither au-
thoritative nor (exclusively) informative, such as the legal sentences invoked by
lawyers to persuade judges that someone is or is not legally responsible for a
certain behavior (imagine that, in the course of an argument trying to persuade
a court that the defendant is guilty of tax evasion, a district attorney says, ‘In-
dividuals whose taxable income is above $1,000,000 a year shall pay a tax of 50
percent on income’).2 For present purposes, we can bypass such complications
by stipulating that normative sentences to which the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’
are inapplicable can be more or less ‘acceptable’, ‘reasonable’, or (now in an ab-
solute, black-and-white sense) ‘valid’, in a sense of ‘valid’ that differs from the
one applicable to deductive contexts, since here it is intended to apply to rules
or principles, rather than to arguments composed of descriptive sentences. The
notion of deductive validity could now be expanded to capture both descriptive
arguments where truth is necessarily carried from premises to conclusion and
normative arguments where those other virtues of acceptability, reasonability,
or validity are necessarily carried from premises to conclusion. Thus, a sound
judicial decision (e.g., a conviction for murder) is the conclusion of a valid (in the
expanded sense) deductive argument whose premises are valid (in the second
sense) legal rules (e.g., a ban on murder enacted by Congress) and true proposi-
tions (e.g., a proposition stating that the defendant murdered someone).
We usually look for sound arguments, since we are usually interested in true
or reasonable conclusions. Sound deductive arguments conform to certain struc-
tural rules or logical forms, such as the rule that allows us to derive proposition
q from the propositions If p, then q, which states in its most general form the
proposition known as a ‘conditional’, and p.3 The soundness of inductive argu-
2 For a nuanced analysis of the semantics of legal statements, which combines descriptive and
normative elements, see Raz 1979, 122–145.
3 Indeed, we can mechanically prove the validity of the logical form ‘If p, then q, and p, then q’,
namely, by showing with a truth-table that the conditional that has ‘If p, then q’ as antecedent
and ‘q’ as consequent is a tautology (i.e., it is true under all combinations of the values ‘true’
and ‘false’ for p and q). I should note, however, that formal logic sometimes lacks mechanical
procedures to prove validity. Thus, proofs of validity in predicate logic, in which the units on which
validity depends are not propositions (as is the case in propositional logic, to which the above
tautology pertains) but rather structural components of propositions (such as the expressions ‘All’376 Guido Pincione
ments depends in addition on background assumptions whose relevance and ac-
ceptability cannot in turn be mechanically ascertained. Thus, sound arguments
by analogy—a type of inductive argument—must instantiate the following pat-
tern:
Objects of type X have properties F, G, H, and so on.
Objects of type Y have properties F, G, H, and so on,
and also an additional property Z.
Therefore, objects of type X have property Z as well.
An analogical argument may instantiate this pattern and still be unsound. This
is so because the similarities stated by its premises must be positively relevant
to the similarity stated in its conclusion. Moreover, the number of similarities
and the variety of the objects of type Y must be relevantly great. Whether these
conditions are met depends on background assumptions (see Salmon 2002, 133–
136). Moreover, what is to count as a relevantly great number of similarities
turns in part on intractable questions about property individuation, e.g. whether
the property of being a certain shade of yellow is different from the property of
being another shade of yellow. Claims of positive relevance to the similarity
stated in the conclusion depend in turn on complex causal assumptions. Will
color and shape similarities render it likely that this tennis ball will taste the
same as this lemon? If not, can you state a counterexample-free criterion of
positive relevance? Critical-thinking textbooks provide some clues to answering
these sorts of questions by making students reﬂect on concrete examples, alert-
ing them about common fallacies—i.e., unsound yet persuasive arguments—and
drawing their attention to factors on which soundness commonly—though not
mechanically—depends.
For present purposes, the following difference between critical thinking and
formal logic is worth stressing. As I have already said, one obvious difference is
that critical thinking is about arguments stated in ordinary language, whereas
formal logic works with a formal language. We have also seen, though, that crit-
ical thinkers should be sensitive to the structural features on which soundness
depends: good translations into the sort of semi-formal language illustrated by
the above pattern of analogical argument are often effective tools for assessing
the strength of arguments. In a sense, then, critical thinking precedes, or is a
step toward, formal logic. Still, good critical thinkers do not have to know formal
logic. In particular, they do not have to be able to state the rules of formation
of sentences and the rules of inference of the formal language that underlies
non-formal contexts, let alone to prove theorems in that formal language. For
example, formal logic employs truth-tables to prove that compound sentences
instantiating the logical form (((P ¾ Q) & P) ¾ Q)4 are tautologies (i.e., true sen-
and ‘Some’, or variables standing for particular objects, properties, or relations), require creativity.
4 The following is a possible translation of this conventional notation into ordinary language: ‘If
proposition P entails proposition Q, where ‘P’ and ‘Q’ stand for any proposition, and P is true, then
Q is true.’ So we have here a conditional within another conditional. See note 3 and accompanying
text.Critical Thinking and Legal Culture 377
tences, whatever sentences Pand Q stand for). It can also be proved in formal
logic that such tautologies yield deductively valid arguments when we take P
¾ Q and P as premises, and Q as a conclusion. Now whether a piece of ordi-
nary language is meant to instantiate that logical form may be a complex issue
that, among other things, turns on the speaker’s intentions—something that is
often difﬁcult to ascertain, given the pervasiveness of ambiguity and vagueness
in ordinary language. Critical thinking addresses such preliminary interpretive
questions, and for this reason it requires a great deal of judgment, in contrast to
the rule-governed procedures used by formal logicians to ascertain validity and
other structural features of the language which they work with.
It should now be clear that we should expect good critical thinkers to possess
a generic ability to produce sound reasoning. The choice to think critically is
open to us at every moment, whether we deal with everyday problems or with
problems pertaining to any systematic ﬁeld of inquiry. One can think critically
about all kinds of arguments, whether biological, political, mathematical, legal,
etc., and one can do so in settings at least as diverse as commercial advertising,
electoral campaigns, op-eds, judicial opinions, and scholarly books. Since we
can think critically about any subject matter, there is a sense in which critical
thinking is formal rather than substantive—though, as we saw, it is not formal
in the sense in which formal logic is.
3. Critical Thinking and Legal Reasoning
Notice that our ability to determine whether an argument is deductively valid
need not go hand in hand with our ability to determine whether an argument
is sound. Thus, a legislator or judge unfamiliar with basic propositions of eco-
nomics will be prone to advocate laws or judicial interpretations that defeat
their stated purposes, even if he is capable of devising complex logical proofs
of solutions to legal cases.5 Imagine, for instance, that a legislator submits a
bill depriving employers from the legal power to reassign workers to different
tasks. She grounds this proposal by saying that such a power jeopardizes work-
ers’ opportunities for rewarding jobs—a goal that most economists would deem
unattainable through regulations that render hiring less proﬁtable, as such a
bill arguably is. Indeed, if the Constitution guarantees a right to work,6 one
can argue that such a bill ﬂouts the Constitution, on the plausible assumption
that constitutional rights generate actionable claims to a legal system that pro-
motes certain interests or choices—here, the unemployed’s interest in getting
a rewarding job, an interest that a dynamic labor market (and the resulting
general prosperity) is more likely to further. It is through critical thinking, not
merely through logic, that we stay on the alert for the background information
needed to devise sound legal arguments. Such information is not only about the
5 For a formal analysis of legal reasoning, see Alchourrón and Bulygin 1972.
6 As is the case, for instance, under the Argentine Constitution, article 14 bis.378 Guido Pincione
facts of the case, narrowly conceived, but also about theories (in the present ex-
ample, labor economics) in the light of which we explain and predict facts such
as increases or decreases in opportunities for rewarding jobs.7
We can now see why lawyers and other users of legal argument are especially
in need of critical thinking. Most disciplines have a fairly well-deﬁned subject
matter, and correspondingly well-deﬁned argumentative techniques. Thus, stu-
dents of biology are exposed from the beginning to certain patterns of descrip-
tion, evidence-gathering, and assessment of theories. They deal with empirical
propositions and use widely accepted standards of empirical reasoning. To be
sure, there is considerable philosophical disagreement about the logical struc-
ture of such reasoning and the degree to which it supports its conclusions, yet
such disagreements do not prevent biologists from converging on a mostly well-
deﬁned set of propositions, and on methods of inquiry that put a premium on
theories that ﬁt the empirical data. All of this is in sharp contrast to the study
of law. Even a cursory inspection of a standard law program sufﬁces to show
the variety of types of argument that law students are exposed to. There are
lots of deductive argument—e.g., arguments purporting to show that a certain
case falls within a legal rule, or arguments purporting to show that a legal rule
conforms to the Constitution—along with lots of empirical reasoning—e.g., ar-
guments purporting to determine the strength of the evidence for conviction in
a criminal case. Indeed, legal problems import all the complexities attendant to
the full range of empirical disciplines as these are potentially relevant to ascrib-
ing civil or criminal liability—think of the relevance of physics and physiology
in malpractice suits where lawyers and judges are confronted with conﬂicting
expert testimonies on the stability of a bridge’s foundations or the side effects
of a drug. Of course, law students are not expected to master, or even to pos-
sess an above-average expertise on, empirical disciplines, but they must be able
to arbitrate in principled ways conﬂicting expert testimonies—and judges are
legally bound to do so.8 Moreover, it is in the nature of legal problems to involve
rules and principles, and this fact calls for interpretive techniques that are of-
ten opaque to lay persons. This raises special problems for critical thinkers.
For example, the extent to which common-law reasoning resembles empirical
analogical arguments is debatable:9 we have here a meta-problem about rele-
vant similarity which compounds the above ﬁrst-order problems raised by em-
pirical analogical arguments (see previous section). In short, legal questions
potentially involve all subject matters and call for diverse types of arguments,
including meta-arguments about the applicability of standard critical-thinking
criteria to normative contexts. Pedagogical pressures toward instilling generic
argumentative skills, skills that enable lawyers to identify, from among a great
variety of standards for argumentative soundness, those applicable to a given
7 Tesón and I (2006) discuss the many ways in which public deliberation on legal and political issues
is distorted by the systematic appeal to faulty theories.
8 For a discussion of the role of empirical sciences in legal proceedings, see Goldman 1999, 304–311.
9 For a classical discussion of analogy in common-law reasoning, see Levy 1949.Critical Thinking and Legal Culture 379
legal problem, are distinctive of high-quality legal education. Hence the spe-
cial importance of critical thinking in legal studies.
The claim that lawyers need generic argumentative skills gains further sup-
port from the fact that legal, and specially constitutional, interpretation is a
matter of persistent debates. Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars do not con-
ﬁne their arguments to drawing inferences from legal materials: they also ar-
gue about the very method of ascertaining the meaning of those legal materials.
They argue, for instance, about whether they should abide by the original intent
of the framers of the Constitution, or rather by current ordinary meanings. Or
consider the references to moral notions such as reasonableness, fairness, due
care, and cruelty that we ﬁnd scattered throughout legal materials. It is obvious
that such notions render legal argument moral in nature.
In their everyday work, judges and lawyers confront such interpretative
and moral questions, and to that extent the practice of law—let alone legal
theorizing—involves philosophical questions that have no parallel in the ev-
eryday work of the empirical scientist.10 If we add to this the fact, already
indicated, that the practice of law requires far more varied argumentative skills
than biology and other empirical sciences do, it is tempting to conclude that
judges and lawyers confront on average more difﬁcult problems than other sci-
entists. I take no sides on this issue, though—perhaps judges and lawyers deal
with a greater variety of easier problems. My point here is that users of legal
argument need especially generic argumentative skills due to the variety of the
arguments they work with. As we have seen, the discipline of critical thinking
is precisely about such skills. Helping law students develop them is therefore
especially urgent.
Legal issues are therefore less self-contained than those of most, if not all,
other conventional disciplines. It is hard to ﬁnd counterexamples. Consider
again biology, a ﬁeld that may look interdisciplinary in a way that undermines
the distinction I am trying to make. Biology largely relies on chemistry, which
in turns is ultimately reducible to physics. Notice, however, that biologists,
chemists, and physicists employ the same criteria for accepting and rejecting
propositions. They all reason inductively, hypothetico-deductively, or according
to any other more or less explicit rules (philosophers of science of course dis-
agree on how to reconstruct those rules, yet it does not seem debatable that
biology is a rule-governed activity). To be sure, biology students must take a
number of courses outside the ﬁeld conventionally classiﬁed as ‘biology’—say,
courses in chemistry and physics—but this gives them no reason to change the
basic types of reasoning they employ in dealing with narrowly-deﬁned biological
problems. As they cross conventional disciplinary boundaries they experience
10 Ronald Dworkin has persuasively argued that legal interpretation—surely a skill that law schools
should promote—is inescapably intertwined with moral philosophy. See Dworkin 1986, 45–86,
225–275. Notice that those legal ‘positivists’ who claim that external observers can describe a legal
system without thereby committing themselves to moral views need not deny Dworkin’s thesis,
which is persuasive when it comes to judicial interpretation, though I guess Dworkin himself will
probably dispute this interpretation of his views.380 Guido Pincione
differences in degree, e.g. in how much math they need to solve problems, yet
they never abandon the territory of empirical methodology. By and large, forays
into chemistry or into physics do not force biology students to shift to fundamen-
tally different styles of reasoning.11
The moral of all this is that legal education should foster generic argumen-
tative skills—an ability to assess the open-ended variety of arguments that may
come about in legal disputes, even if we circumscribe these to cases brought be-
fore the courts. Legislative activity requires even more generic argumentative
skills, if only because legislators typically face complex causal problems (‘Which
sort of law will best achieve our political goals?’). Being applicable to all subject
matters and types of arguments, a good training in critical thinking is then es-
pecially appropriate to a law curriculum. This almost completes my case for the
claim that lawyers, judges, legal academics, and more generally citizens con-
cerned with legal interpretation or change should excel in critical thinking. I
write ‘almost’ because someone may object that critical thinking will not provide
legal practitioners with competitive advantages in legal cultures that put a pre-
mium on unsound legal argument. Many countries do not enjoy the beneﬁts of
the rule of law. Arbitrariness, rather than sound argument, is there the source
of laws and judicial decisions. It would seem that in such systems political con-
nections and other sorts of non-argumentative factors will determine success or
failure in the legal profession. In replying to this objection in the next section, I
hope to clear the way for the other claims that I promised to defend, namely, the
claim that there is a happy harmony between professional and moral reasons to
teach critical thinking at law schools, and the claim that thinking critically is
non-optional for agents who are both epistemically and instrumentally rational.
4. A Relativist Objection
Here is one possible challenge to my thesis that thinking critically about the law
will beneﬁt judges, lawyers, and other users of legal discourse. A legal culture
may be hostile to critical thinking to the point that unsound arguments enjoy
rhetorical advantages. Imagine that those who are widely regarded as legal ex-
perts or authorities are unwilling to change their views (at least, their ofﬁcially
stated views) if exposed to the fallacies on which such views rest. We can even
imagine that lawyers, legislators, and judges display patterns of argument that
entitle them to condemn the rules and standards of critical thinking as falla-
cious, irrelevant, or otherwise ﬂawed. Still, they see themselves as playing the
same argumentation game as that played by critical thinkers. A game is deﬁned
by rules that apply only to those willing to play it—it lacks authority over those
who decide to play a different game. Crucially, critical thinkers are willing to
11 In other words, there is a level of abstraction at which all those disciplines share a method, despite
their obvious differences in techniques of research, design of experiments, etc. General theories
about the method of empirical sciences purport to reach that level of abstraction, as illustrated by
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play the prevailing game, under a suitably abstract characterization of it; after
all, by denouncing the prevailing fallacies, critical thinkers see themselves in
turn as making moves in the argumentation game that members of the prevail-
ing legal culture play too. Critical thinkers are here in the position of those soc-
cer players who sincerely criticize all of the referee’s calls yet nevertheless keep
playing. Therefore, they would lack a foothold in the prevailing legal culture to
break it down, since they endorse rules and standards for assessing arguments
that the prevailing culture rejects. We may even assume that the legal culture I
am imagining is in rhetorical equilibrium. That is, users of legal discourse react
to a structure of incentives that rewards those who publicly engage in (certain
patterns of) truth-insensitive reasoning, and penalizes those who don’t: given
what others do, it is best for each to keep reasoning as they do.12 Rewards and
penalties may take a variety of forms, from better or worse job opportunities in
legal academia or the courts to the ratio of won over lost cases. Such a structure
of incentives engenders the legal culture that I am imagining, i.e. the prevail-
ing practices of legal argument in judicial proceedings, academia, the media,
congressional debates, and so on. Let us call a culture like this a corrupt legal
culture. Reﬂection on a corrupt legal culture may prompt a relativist objection
to my thesis that critical thinkers will do better in the variety of roles performed
by legal experts. For how can critical thinkers succeed in legal cultures that
embrace rules and standards of reasoning under which critical thinking, as I
understand it, is systematically misguided?
In a corrupt legal culture, truth-sensitive strategies fail.13 Still, no one is
forced to play the game in which such a culture consists, with its available strate-
gies, players, and payoffs. But for states that force everyone to play an Orwellian
argumentation game, the very existence of a corrupt legal culture creates a mar-
ket for criticism. Academics and journalists, for example, will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to write books and op-ed articles challenging the prevailing culture. Intellectual
impostures make denunciatory markets attractive, and widespread intellectual
impostures make those markets even more attractive. In those denunciatory
markets, rewards and penalties are reversed—critical thinkers have competi-
tive advantages there. Social criticism has always and everywhere proved to
be a marketable commodity.14 Though in a corrupt legal culture it attracts, by
hypothesis, a relatively small number of consumers, their interest in the demys-
12 For stylistic reasons, here and elsewhere I use the term ‘truth’ and cognate words broadly, mean-
ing to encompass reasonability, validity, and other widely-held virtues of normative reasoning.
13 Tesón and I (2006, 44–50, 53–64) indicate the incentives that induce politicians, academics, and
other participants in political deliberation to publicly endorse positions at odds with reliable social
science.
14 I do not mean to suggest that the sort of intellectual activity sometimes characterized as ‘social
criticism’ has always, or even mostly, been informed by critical thinking. Social criticism may well
be dogmatic, inattentive to facts, disdainful of valid rules of inference, or otherwise inimical to the
rules and standards that deﬁne critical thinking (see Section II). Indeed, Tesón and I (2006, 35–
37, 53–64) argue that typical forms of social criticism, including academic social criticism, tends
to display certain patterns of error that critical thinkers would avoid.382 Guido Pincione
tifying power of critical thinking will in all likelihood grow with the expansion
of the corrupt legal culture.
Corrupt legal cultures give rise, then, to markets for demystiﬁcation. A num-
ber of lawyers willing and able to think critically will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to work
outside the corrupt legal culture—say, in journalism, think thanks, or as free-
lance writers. If they are lucky to live in a country where entry to markets for
legal education is reasonably free, as opposed to burdened by barriers to com-
petition with the law schools and research institutions of the prevailing legal
culture, they might as well ﬁnd a place in the academia. Some law schools will
hire them in proportion to the (by hypothesis tiny, but as we just saw intense)
demands for demystiﬁcation by the media, think tanks, political parties, and
other organizations that demand experts in public legal discourse.
The emergence of a market for demystiﬁcation raises in turn the opportunity
cost of playing the prevailing game. A spread of critical thinking about legal is-
sues will raise the personal cost of publicly endorsing unsound legal arguments.
To be sure, the corrupt legal culture I am imagining lacks internal penalties for
unsound reasoning (e.g., appellate reversal of ill-grounded trial-court decisions,
with adverse effects on the careers of trial-court judges), yet the opportunity
cost of playing the corrupt game, measured by the expected beneﬁt of shifting
to the critical-thinking game, will raise. Because corrupt legal cultures spawn
markets in which critical thinkers possess competitive advantages, a legal ed-
ucation that fosters critical thinking both facilitates the emergence of such a
market and beneﬁts from it, even if its size remains small relative to the pre-
vailing legal culture.15 The relativist objection fails, then, on two counts: (i) a
corrupt legal culture makes markets for demystiﬁcation proﬁtable, with criti-
cal thinkers enjoying competitive advantages in those markets, and (ii) critical
thinking sets a limit to the indeﬁnite expansion of a corrupt legal culture.
I have imagined a legal culture where unsound public discourse pays. I did
not mean to suggest that members of such a culture couldn’t beneﬁt by thinking
critically. The fact that a corrupt legal culture rewards unsound public discourse
does not undermine critical thinkers’ ability to determine what a winning strat-
egy will be in that game. On the contrary, we should expect critical thinkers to
excel at discerning the patterns of argument accepted by a corrupt legal culture.
At a fundamental level, critical thinking must be always and everywhere useful,
if only to pick rhetorically advantageous bad arguments.16
15 The patterns of error that Tesón and I diagnose (2006, 21–40) make it unlikely that legal edu-
cation alone signiﬁcantly upset a corrupt legal culture, especially if, as we argue on pp. 53–64,
academic settings themselves are affected by truth-insensitive factors. Still, a few small law
schools may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to cater for the (tiny) markets for critical legal thinking that emerge
in reaction to the prevailing culture.
16 Even though the Argentine legal culture is not particularly friendly to critical thinking (see some
examples below in this section), our law students at Torcuato Di Tella University, Buenos Aires,
have in general better placements than students at other Argentine law schools. The analyti-
cal abilities of Di Tella lawyers are in general highly praised in the job market. All the lawyers
who graduated from UTDT between 2001 and 2005 were able to get job offers on graduation; 59
percent work in big law ﬁrms, while the other 41 percent work elsewhere (ﬁrms, notary’s ofﬁces,Critical Thinking and Legal Culture 383
Another possible objection to a legal education based on critical thinking
takes advantage of the fact that, by deﬁnition, critical thinking is instrumental
to truth. Now agents may put truth at the service of evil. Unless we have rea-
sons to believe that an agent’s ends are legitimate, we’d better keep instruments
of evildoing from him, and truth would be no exception. Certain sorts of non-
critical education, religious or otherwise, may fare better than critical thinking
at inducing him to behave morally. A related suggestion is that our duty to tell
the truth may on occasion give way to other duties, such as our duty to help our
country win a just war. In short, the objection here is that a legal education an-
imated by critical thinking might lead students to overrate truth-telling to the
detriment of higher, or more urgent, ideals.
Consider the following example. Economists say that current (2009) Argen-
tine inﬂation, which reaches a yearly amount of about 17 per cent,17 is caused
by the following factors: (i) the government’s attempt to keep, through the pur-
chase of dollars with printed pesos, the nominal exchange rate higher than the
real exchange rate; (ii) the devaluation of Argentine currency in 2002, whose in-
ﬂationary effects were cushioned for a few years by the depression ensuing the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2001–2002, and became visible once ﬁrms started to re-utilize
their idle productive capacity; (iii) the high increase in welfare state handouts
and bureaucratic waste in the previous years; (iv) the decline in investment
brought about by legal uncertainty and statism (e.g. price controls, national-
izations, bans on exports of meat and other highly demanded goods for which
Argentina has comparative advantages), vast conﬁscations (e.g., of private ac-
counts of social security in 2008); and (v) the sovereign debt default in 2001,
which blocked international credit.18 For present purposes, it is important to no-
tice that this causal analysis entails, given ordinary assumptions about agency,
ascriptions of responsibility: when exposed to the above explanation of inﬂation,
we naturally end up blaming the government.
That was not the prevailing interpretation of the facts, though. The Argen-
tine government managed to divert the public’s rage over inﬂation onto ‘greedy
national or international agencies, academia, etc.) or are doing postgraduate studies at renowned
universities in the US and Europe. Statistics available from UTDT Law School on request. A dis-
tinctive mark of our law program is the incidence of courses informed by critical thinking. Thus,
we have quite a few mandatory courses in analytical philosophy and economics—much more than
other Argentine or American law schools do. While critical thinking permeates such disciplines,
the Argentine doctrinal legal treatises and law journals are scarcely argumentative—certainly,
much less argumentative than their American counterparts. Our doctrinal treatises adopt an ap-
proach called ‘legal dogmatics’, which is in essence a more or less systematized description of the
legal materials, coupled with interpretations largely supported by alleged doctrinal authorities. It
is therefore tempting to infer that the respects in which we most differ from more traditional law
schools (i.e., the incidence of critical thinking), rather than the respects in which we coincide (i.e.,
courses on legal dogmatics) play some role in explaining why our students get better placements.
17 This ﬁgure is based on private estimates. The accuracy of the ofﬁcial rate of inﬂation is widely
contested. See, for example, Mercopress 2009. No doubt, inﬂation would be higher if it were not
for the current recession.
18 See the articles published by Roberto Cachanosky in La Nación, Buenos Aires, since 2003,
http://buscar.lanacion.com.ar/Cachanosky. For an overview of Argentina’s economic policies in
recent years, see Roberts 2008.384 Guido Pincione
businesspersons’. Since inﬂation reappeared in 2006 after ﬁfteen years of price
stability, there were widely publicized presidential meetings with big business-
persons, ofﬁcially aimed at striking ‘price agreements’, which were in effect price
controls enforced through various sorts of threats, from ‘spontaneous’ pickets in
front of recalcitrant ﬁrms to selective prosecutions for tax evasion. The fact that
the current president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, was elected in October
2007 to succeed her husband, Néstor Kirchner, and continue his allegedly suc-
cessful economic policies, suggests that inﬂation, which had reached 20 per cent
in 2008, meant no political cost to the administration. Indeed, Néstor Kirchner
took great care at being perceived by the public as someone who led the ﬁght for
‘fair prices’ against the ‘greedy businesspersons’, the above ‘price agreements’
being part of this strategy. Let me next show how the objection under consider-
ation (that critical thinking is morally neutral and as such sometimes dispens-
able for the sake of worthier goals) might appear to gain support from the kind
of public rhetoric that has been surrounding Argentine inﬂation in recent years.
Everyone beneﬁts from using critical thinking to determine what their best
means to their (sometimes evil) goals are, governments bent on misleading vot-
ers to win elections being no exception. Some of those means are rhetorical in
nature: in the present example, the means adopted by the Argentine govern-
ment consisted in advocating a theory according to which greedy businessper-
sons, rather than the government, brought about inﬂation. Moreover, ordinary
citizens rationally embraced that theory instead of the more reliable one offered
by economists. Given the citizen’s time constraints and personal costs of get-
ting political information that in any event will be of negligible impact in polit-
ical outcomes (the probabilities that any individual vote will affect the outcome
of an election are vanishingly small),19 the ordinary citizen embraces political
views on the grounds of low-cost ‘information’ (including false theories and data).
Politicians’ and rent-seekers’ rational response to citizen’s ignorance is, then, to
invest heavily in political propaganda and ‘information’ easily available to the
ordinary citizen, especially if such ‘information’ ﬁts the (often false) social theo-
ries that rationally ignorant citizens tend to embrace (e.g., visible-hand, conspir-
acy theories, rather than the invisible-hand, impersonal processes theorized by
economists). By being instrumentally rational (i.e., by selecting their personally
least costly means to their goals, given their beliefs) and epistemically rational
(i.e., by forming their beliefs through valid or correct rules of inference from
the available ‘information’ and prior theoretical beliefs), both governments and
citizens converge upon a rhetorical equilibrium where falsehood, and the corre-
sponding ascriptions of responsibility, prevail. The more reliable, but less vivid,
explanations of inﬂation that we ﬁnd in economics textbooks are at a systematic
rhetorical disadvantage. The apparent upshot is, then, that critical thinking
is sometimes socially harmful: the government’s rhetoric, which results from
its thinking critically about means to win elections, induces or reinforces the
public’s support for bad policies, as judged by the public’s own preferences for
19 The seminal work on the rational-ignorance effect in politics is Downs 1957.Critical Thinking and Legal Culture 385
political outcomes (e.g., a preference for price stability and general prosperity).
It is crucial to see that such support is sanctioned by widely accepted methods of
critical thinking, given the theoretical and factual beliefs held by rationally ig-
norant citizens.20 One might also conclude, conversely, that a disposition to hold
beliefs non-critically may well be socially beneﬁcial. If we could induce citizens
to support effective anti-inﬂationary policies on the grounds of inconsistent or
otherwise ill-grounded premises, it would seem that we have a moral duty to do
so.
To be sure, unsound arguments may lead citizens to support good policies.
But sound arguments must lead citizens to support good policies if citizens aim
at valuable social outcomes. This follows from the deﬁnition of ‘sound argu-
ment’: a sound argument, recall, carries the truth (validity, acceptability, etc.) of
its premises to its conclusion. (‘Our goal is G and M is the least personally costly
means of achieving G, so we ought to use M’ is a sound form of argument, if we in
fact have goal G and M is in fact the least personally costly means of archieving
G.) Can we also say that sound arguments are needed to increase our chances
of picking good policies? There are two apparent counterexamples. First, pub-
lic adoption of unsound arguments, such as the appeal in primitive societies to
supernatural forces to justify taboos on eating certain foods, may bring about
good social outcomes, such as the avoidance of certain diseases. Closer inspec-
tion reveals, however, that critical thinkers have better chances of determining
whether the public adoption of ﬂawed reasoning is socially beneﬁcial in a given
occasion; thus, benevolent policy-makers had better engage in sound reasoning
if they are to increase their chances of picking rhetorically effective, but not nec-
essarily sound, public arguments. Second, a sound argument may lead me to a
decision that makes me worse off than I could have been otherwise. Suppose,
for example, that I am offered a lottery with two possible outcomes: $100 if I
choose alternative A and a 50% chance of winning $1,000 if I choose alternative
B. Assuming I am risk neutral, the rational decision for me to make is to choose
B. It turns out that I lose. Shall I then say that critical thinking led me in the
wrong direction? Surely not. My ﬁnally ending up with $0 does not change the
fact that my decision maximized my expected gains, i.e. the payoff I get in case of
winning discounted by the probability of winning. The assumption of risk neu-
trality means precisely that my aim was to maximize my expected gains, and
I fulﬁlled that aim by choosing alternative B whatever the outcome. Critical
thinkers need not bring about their preferred outcomes, yet they are more likely
to achieve them than non-critical thinkers are: critical thinking is not a success
notion, but a procedural one—it applies to our decision-making procedure. This
point can be generalized to moral decision making: in the long run, we reach our
moral objectives (general welfare, improving the lot of the poor, freedom for all,
20 For a detailed argument for the convergence of instrumental and epistemic rationality onto a
political rhetorical equilibrium where falsehood prevails, see Pincione and Tesón 2006, 8–86. If
Tesón and I are right, the public rhetoric that accompanied Argentine inﬂation in recent years
illustrates a general barrier to a citizen’s understanding of political issues, even assuming instru-
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equality of resources, or whatever else the reader may deem appropriate) most
effectively by reasoning critically—though this may sometimes lead us to pub-
licly endorse unsound arguments, depending on how much intellectual integrity
weighs in our total system of goals. Law schools can help students reason crit-
ically. If students happen to be public-spirited, critical thinking will help them
achieve their lofty goals; if they aren’t, I doubt that critical thinking will make
things comparably worse than non-critical or unreﬂective methods of belief for-
mation will.
The social cost of a corrupt legal culture may reach a threshold of visibil-
ity beyond which it becomes transparent to even rationally ignorant citizens.
The prevailing legal discourse may then start to crumble, giving way to a new
rhetorical equilibrium. Of course, the move from one equilibrium to the other
is possible only if exogenous factors intervene—this is of the nature of equilib-
rium. Political rhetoric in times of inﬂation serves again by way of illustration.
The 1989 Argentine hyperinﬂation made it transparent to most citizens that
decades-long price controls were ineffective. Given the emphatic constitutional
provisions that “all the inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the following
rights: [...] to trade” (art. 14), that “property may not be violated, and no inhab-
itant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based on
law”, and that “expropriation for reasons of public interest must be authorized
by law and previously compensated” (art. 17), the sanction of price controls by
the courts required a watering down in the concept of private property which
informed the framers’ intent. Under the original interpretation, price control
violates the constitutional guarantee of private property and the contractual
freedom which was taken to be entailed by that guarantee. The Supreme Court
upheld this interpretation since the promulgation of the Constitution in 1853 up
to the 1920s.21 From the mid 1940s, politically-selected judges, along with law
professors working at state-funded, or at any rate heavily regulated and politi-
cized law schools, embraced a ‘social’ idea of property under which price control
and myriad anti-competitive regulations came to be seen as compatible with
the constitutional protection of private property. Governments became in this
way constitutional authorized to yield to electoral incentives to print money to
subsidize well-organized groups, to introduce regulations protecting politically
connected ﬁrms from domestic and foreign competition, and to engender a huge
bureaucracy which was largely composed of political clients. The economic and
legal doctrines prevailing in universities furnished academic credentials to the
public’s vivid beliefs in businesspersons ‘abusing’ their property rights by selling
above ‘fair’ prices. Inﬂation was widely seen as their fault.22
21 A turning point was the Supreme Court ruling in ‘Ercolano c/ Lanteri’ (1922), ‘CSJN, Fallos,
136:164’, which upheld rent control laws. See Berensztein and Spector 2003, 331–348. Juan
Bautista Alberdi, the framer of the 1853 Constitution, unambiguously interpreted the consti-
tutional protection of property as referring to the classical liberal, full-ownership conception of
property, which clearly rules out price control. See Alberdi 1854, 7–91. For a seminal analysis of
the classical liberal conception of private property, see Honoré 1961.
22 For a general explanation of the public’s rational acceptance of this kind of rhetoric, see Pincione
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In 1989, hyperinﬂation disrupted this rhetorical equilibrium. Citizens found
it hard to believe that a conspiracy of millions of ﬁrms and retailers were re-
sponsible for the huge, simultaneous, and everyday price increases. Notice that
no exception to the rational ignorance effect was involved here: the facts were
so visible that no investment in political information was needed. The warn-
ings of a few economists and the so far unpopular politicians inspired by them
against money printing and government waste (primarily through state-owned
public utilities, railroads, and the oil company) as major culprits of inﬂation
started to make sense to millions of citizens who had been persuaded by the
most vivid, conspiracy explanation of inﬂation. A number of slogans more or
less in tune with scholarly explanations of inﬂation in terms of money supply
(‘The government should stop printing money to ﬁnance political clients’, ‘Public
enterprises are wasteful because bureaucrats do not expend their own money’)
made some steps among journalists and politicians toward superseding a rhetor-
ical equilibrium where monetary explanations of inﬂation had competitive dis-
advantages in electoral politics. I submit that such a mutation in public opinion
must have played an important role in the wide popular support for deregu-
lation and privatization in Argentina between 1989 and 1995.23 Perhaps not
coincidentally, an economically informed legal literature emerged, along with
the introduction of courses on economic analysis of law at law schools.24 While
an equilibrium cannot possibly be disrupted endogenously, the statist rhetori-
cal equilibrium prevailing for decades in Argentine politics, and its manifesta-
tion in the legal culture that I have outlined, faced an exogenous countervailing
force—hyperinﬂation, with its fast transmission of inexpensive information that
undermined, in the public’s eyes, the conspiracy theories that had prevailed so
far.25
Hyperinﬂation had a further adverse impact on the statist rhetorical equi-
librium: in the early 90s, it became electorally convenient for President Carlos
Menem to privatize and deregulate vast sectors of the economy in order to in-
ternalize the immediately perceived beneﬁts of price stability, such as the end of
social unrest (the 1989 Argentine hyperinﬂation brought about social unrest, in-
cluding massive violent plundering shops in Buenos Aires and other big cities)
and the expansion of consumer credit. In contrast, typical measures against
moderate inﬂation harm in the short run well-organized groups (such as pub-
lic employees and state suppliers) which stand to lose from reductions in public
spending, with no offsetting electoral beneﬁts in the short run. The government
was therefore able to internalize the political beneﬁts of ﬁghting hyperinﬂation
23 I do not mean to suggest that most Argentines who came to support privatization and deregu-
lation in those years did it for good reasons. My analysis only implies that hyperinﬂation offset
the rational-ignorance effect by providing for free evidence for the claim that the government
must have had something to do with huge, simultaneous, and everyday price increases—it looked
against common sense to attribute such increases to conspiracies among millions of ﬁrms and
retailers. See Pincione and Tesón 2006, 98–105.
24 See, for example, the collection edited by Spector (2004).
25 For a fuller discussion of this example in connection with citizens’ rational ignorance, see Pincione
2008. For a general theory of rhetorical political equilibria, see Pincione and Tesón 2006, 8–64.388 Guido Pincione
through measures that in ordinary times externalize political beneﬁts (in terms
of general prosperity, avoidance of future social unrest, and long-term reduc-
tion of poverty) to other administrations in the more or less distant future. The
re-election of Menem by a substantial majority in 1995 conﬁrms this analysis.
These episodes in the Argentine political economy of the 90s and its con-
comitant public rhetoric suggest, I think, a moderately optimistic conclusion:
even in a corrupt legal culture a government will adopt public policies that well-
informed critical thinkers would support (yet perhaps for different reasons26),
and the courts will uphold such policies,27 provided that exogenous forces make
the social costs of the current laws and judicial decisions visible to electorally de-
cisive coalitions. The 2001 Argentine ﬁnancial crisis (which was in turn largely
the result of keeping a currency board even though public spending skyrock-
eted in the 90s28) can be seen as an exogenous force that in turn upset the
market-friendly features of the economic policies of the 90s. The restored public
support for a nationalistic and statist political discourse, shown by the complete
absence of (at least openly) pro-globalization and market-friendly political par-
ties in current (2009) Argentine politics,29 conﬁrms Tesón’s and mine hypothesis
that nationalistic and statist discourse has competitive advantages in politics
even though the public policies thought to follow from such a discourse frustrate
its stated goals, such as improving the lot of the poor or promoting general pros-
perity.30 Even these recent events, however, fail to show that critical thinking is
seldom effective in politics; they just show that public political statements sanc-
tioned by critical thinking (at the very least, statements that are not blatantly
inconsistent with reliable social sciences) may well be avoided by politicians who
think critically in their competion for power.
This last remark points to another optimistic conclusion: at the most funda-
mental level of decision making, we are well advised to think critically, if only
because critical thinking enables us to select our most persuasive ﬁrst-order ar-
gumentative strategies, whether or not these pass muster before the canons of
critical thinking. In this respect, what holds for political discourse holds for
legal discourse too. Critical thinking might lead a defendant in a lawsuit to de-
liberately advance fallacious reasoning (she might even be morally justiﬁed, all
things considered, in doing so). An argument to the effect that a fallacy will
26 For reﬂections on how good policies may be supported by rational citizens for bad reasons, see
Pincione and Tesón 2006, 98–105.
27 The period between 1991 and 2000 featured judicial decisions at odds with the statist, interven-
tionist doctrines of the preceding decades. For example, a federal court in Posadas upheld in 2000
the constitutionality of the Presidential decree that deregulated all industrial and commercial
activities in 1991, against challenges that such a decree ran counter the ‘legitimate interests’ of
members of the union of newspaper vendors. See La Nación 2000.
28 For a nice discussion of the Argentine 2001 crisis against the background of a general theory of
the economic, legal, and rhetorical aspects of economic crises, see Spector 2009.
29 Thus, to the best of my knowledge none of the dozens of political parties that competed in the 2009
midterm elections employed a market-friendly rhetoric. On the contrary, vigorous vindications of
the regulatory role of the state along with allegations that opponents supported the deregulation
and privatization policies of the early 90s were central themes in the electoral campaign.
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be persuasive need not be fallacious itself; indeed, it must not be fallacious if
the defendant’s aim is to persuade the court. Lawyers, whose job description
is to persuade the courts of the merits of their clients’ cases, are well advised
to think critically at the meta-level at which they select their argumentative
strategies. Even if, by its very nature, we cannot signiﬁcantly undermine a cor-
rupt legal culture by showing that it systematically infringes the rules of critical
thinking, we can minimize its evils—we can more effectively achieve incremen-
tal moral gains—by thinking critically. A corrupt public discourse may well
coexist with morally justiﬁable laws, judicial sentences, and public policies, and
critical thinking helps us ﬁgure out how.
5. Concluding Remarks
I have argued that corrupt legal cultures give rise to markets for demystiﬁcation,
and also that critical thinkers can take advantage of exogenous forces to signif-
icantly undermine a corrupt legal culture. Critical thinking is then not just a
valuable tool for lawyers and judges pursuing successful careers. It enables the
achievement of worthy goals without making things comparably worse if agents
happen to pursue unworthy goals—all too often, agents who pursue unworthy
goals carelessly just delay their achievement, and there is no reason to believe
that they will do much good in the meantime. I want to end by suggesting that
critical thinking has indeed more than that instrumental value. A community
of critical thinkers is a community where everybody follows the rules of sound
reasoning. When sound reasoning guides the discussion of legal issues, the com-
munity has already taken a crucial step toward the rule of law, whatever the
speciﬁc contents of the legal materials. For rules, rather than persons, reign
supreme in it, and nobody can create or manipulate those rules.390 Guido Pincione
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